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Making Sense of the Health-
Care Reform Debate
Robert Hockett
Much of the confusion over the health-care debate 
can possibly be minimized, writes this law professor 
in an essay that goes to first principles, if we recognize 
that health insurance is much like a public utility. He 
makes a fresh if philosophical case for his argument 
that is well worth reading. The result is more clarity 
about what the health-care debate is all about and 
what direction a solution should take.
Most of those engaged in the 2009 health-care reforM debate have been inexplicit and unsystematic about the insurance-theoretic premises of their arguments. It should therefore 
be helpful to call back to mind some of the apparently forgotten 
“basics” of insurance and social insurance, as both theoretical and 
practical disciplines. By reminding ourselves of these fundamentals, 
we will better understand what is at stake in the current debate, as 
well as what the protagonists are driving at in their more obscure mo-
ments. More important, we will be better equipped to judge among 
alternative proposed plans.
In what follows, I first lay out systematically those fundamentals 
of insurance that are most relevant to the current health-care reform 
debate, as well as the market failures to which insurance is always 
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structurally prone. Then I explain how those failures are intensified 
when what we wish to insure against is catastrophic loss of health.
The upshot of the discussion is that the challenges to which health 
insurance is inherently prone render it a classic candidate for what 
has venerably been called “social insurance”—the category under 
which fall social security, Medicare, Medicaid, AFDC (Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children), and like programs that have long enjoyed 
broad popular support. I am careful to distinguish this phrase—“social 
insurance”—from the other “social” word with which demagogues 
now are extravagantly conflating it—“socialism.” Finally, I indicate 
how much more sensible some proposals look than others when 
viewed as what they are: would-be solutions to a classic social insur-
ance problem.
Insurance: How It Works, When It Works, When It 
Does Not
You might not know it, if you listen to the present debate over health-
care reform as conducted in the mass media, but there is actually a 
well-developed theory of insurance. There is also a sophisticated un-
derstanding of how insurance works in the proverbial “real world.” 
Rudiments of the subject were familiar to the biblical Joseph and 
Pharaoh, as well as to Thales, the ancient Greek philosopher who 
apparently designed the first “futures” contract—as it happens, for 
olives, ahead of a harvest that Thales expected to come up short. Much 
of the most interesting work done by contemporary economists as 
celebrated as Akerlof, Arrow, Borch, and Stiglitz, moreover, has been 
devoted to insurance and cognate subjects.1
The fundamental idea behind insurance is deceptively simple. Bad 
things happen to good people, who often can do little or nothing to 
prevent them. Many of these things, moreover, occur “at random” so 
far as their individual victims are concerned, though with surpris-
ingly predictable regularity so far as their frequency among the larger 
population is concerned. We know, in other words, that these catas-
trophes are highly likely to befall some but not all of us, through no 
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fault of our own. We just do not know whom. And because we do not 
know whom, we know it is possible that anyone—you, I, or someone 
in whose shoes you or I might have stood—might be the next faultless 
victim. Inasmuch as none of us knows who will be next, while each 
of us knows that she or he might be next, we are all risk-bearers. And 
we are in a sense “all alike,” or “all one,” in the face of these risks: It 
can happen to any of us. We are “in it” together.
Insurance is simply the time-honored means by which we act to-
gether to address—to “pool”—these risks we all face and to do so as 
fairly and efficiently as possible.
Assume that you are a farmer and so am I. Say there are a hundred 
of us farmers, in fact. Each of us owns a barn and must have that barn 
in order to farm; our barns are our principal capital outlays. Say we 
also know that, in general, one in every hundred barns catches fire 
and burns every year, notwithstanding the best efforts of each of us 
to prevent fires in our barns. Now if each of us acts entirely alone, 
it will be tempting for each of us to attempt to set aside money, up 
to the value of our barns, to ensure that we are able to replace our 
barns should they burn. After all, if you lose your barn to next year’s 
fire, you are wiped out. So you will want to be prepared in order to 
avoid that contingency. And if you act alone, you will have to do all 
the preparing yourself.
But that is inefficient: There is only a 1 percent chance that your 
barn will burn. Yet you are trying to set aside—under the mattress, so 
to speak—the full value of your barn, and that is an awful lot of money 
doing nothing. Should you set aside only 1 percent of the value of 
your barn, then, since that is the expected value of your possible loss? 
That does not seem satisfactory either. For if your barn does burn, 
you will lack 99 percent of what you need to replace it, while the 1 
percent you have set aside will have been set aside unproductively, 
since it is not enough to replace the barn anyway.
And this, of course, is why insurance was developed. Instead of each 
of us acting alone, we act together. We cooperate—we jointly pool our 
several risks. We notice that there are one hundred of us, we realize 
that this means that one of us will lose her barn, we also realize that 
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we do not know who the unlucky farmer will be, and so we jointly 
chip into one pool one hundred contributions that aggregate to the 
value of one barn. If each of us chips in 1 percent, the full risk will 
be covered, each of us will have paid in her fair share, and each will 
accordingly be fully covered against the risk of a lost barn, leaving 
the other 99 percent of the value of her barn free for investment in 
more seed or equipment or whatever.
Now notice that this arrangement is not only efficient but fair: 
We not only minimize the amount that has to be set aside to pro-
vide against risk, we also apportion the shared risk-burden equally: 
Everyone puts in the same, and everyone has equal—which in this 
case is to say full—coverage against the risk of losing her livelihood. 
(I am, of course, assuming here that all barns are alike for the sake 
of simplicity.) Fairness and efficiency often run together like this in 
insurance markets, a fact that doubtless accounts for the attractiveness 
of insurance-reminiscent “veiled choice” scenarios in the writings of 
some justice theorists.2 Below, I will address forces that sometimes 
prise apart the two attributes further.
Now while our barn parable is of course highly stylized and simpli-
fied, it nevertheless carries within it all central features of insurance 
theory and practice as developed by economists and actuaries. The 
best way to show this is by simply summarizing what these people 
have singled out as the basic prerequisites to smoothly functioning 
insurance arrangements, referring back to the parable of the barns 
along the way. I will also emphasize the flip sides of these requisites—
the forms of market failure to which insurance is prone.
Event Independence
The first requisite to well-functioning insurance arrangements typi-
cally singled out by theorists and practitioners is that the contingencies 
against which people wish to insure—what we call “insured events”—be 
as statistically “independent” of one another as is practicable.3 The 
contrary of independence is “covariance.” Whether my barn burns 
must be independent of whether your barn burns. The catastrophe 
Hockett
32 Challenge/January–February 2010
that is a burning barn must not be “contagious.” A sweeping prairie 
fire of the sort that could take out all of our barns in one go will be 
harder to insure against than will, say, more discrete, lightning-caused 
fires. Indeed, if the would-be pool is to be limited to those who in-
habit the prairie in question, we will not be able to insure against 
such fires at all.
Risk-pooling works only when risks actually eventuate only for 
some, rather than all, in the risk pool. If our risks are not independent 
but instead covary, it means that the risk in question tends to occur 
in wavelike fashion, hitting most or all whenever it hits one. In such 
case the logic of pooling breaks down. There are no unaffected parties 
to cross-compensate affected parties. This is why it has been histori-
cally difficult, for example, to insure against floods. “When it rains, 
it pours.” When water levels rise in a particular vicinity, they tend to 
soak all in that vicinity, meaning that there are no lucky winners to 
compensate unlucky losers—at least not until insurance pools grow 
large enough to embrace contributors from multiple vicinities.
Note that there is an affirmative lesson in this last observation in ad-
dition to the negative one: All else equal, you get greater independence 
and less covariance among insured events—hence better-functioning 
insurance arrangements—as you enlarge the insurance pool. That 
is part of why real-world insurance companies tend to grow larger 
and larger, with more and more diversified pools of policyholders. 
Insurance arrangements, in short, tend to enjoy “scale” or “network” 
effects, meaning in turn that they bear “natural monopoly” character-
istics. But more of this below in connection with the market failures 
to which insurance is prone.
Cost Estimability
The second requisite for well-functioning insurance arrangements is 
the so-called verifiability and probable-cost measurability—in sum, the 
“estimability”—of insured events’ occurrence and associated harm.4 
In the burning barn parable, I assumed that we know one barn in a 
hundred will burn each year, and that we know both when a barn 
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burns and what it costs to replace a burnt barn. I assumed, that is, a 
specific probability distribution and a specific cost associated with the 
would-be insured event that is a barn’s burning. In the absence of such 
knowledge, we would not know how much to set aside, or how much 
to require that each member of the pool chip in. In modern insurance 
parlance, that is just to say that those who seek insurance would not 
know how much coverage to seek, while those who manage the pooled 
funds would not know how much in the way of premiums to assess. 
This requirement is as stark in the case of a market arrangement as it 
is in the case of some nonmarket or hybrid arrangement. Workably 
rational markets require rationally priceable products.
It is worth noting in connection with this estimability requirement 
that here, too, as in the case of event independence, the broadening 
of insurance pools tends to enhance the workability of insurance. The 
reason is that we tend to acquire better statistical knowledge both of 
the costs occasioned by insured events and of their likelihoods, as 
we widen the field of those whose risks we insure: a straightforward 
consequence of the “law of large numbers.” So in respect to this req-
uisite, too, there is a tendency for insurance pools to enjoy economies 
of scale: All else equal, the more who take part in insurance arrange-
ments, the more feasible and efficient insurance becomes. But again, 
more of this below, particularly since all else is not always equal.
Symmetric Information
The third requisite to a well-functioning insurance arrangement is 
that there be a reasonable degree of “informational symmetry” be-
tween insurers and insureds.5 The contrary condition—asymmetric 
information or informational asymmetry—for its part comes in two 
particularly well-known flavors: what we call adverse selection in the 
one case, and moral hazard in the other.
Roughly speaking, the first—adverse selection—refers to cases in 
which those seeking insurance are feared to know something about 
their own vulnerability that providers of insurance do not—knowledge 
that might be what prompts the seeker to seek insurance in the first 
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place. Where prospective insurers reasonably have this fear, they tend 
to shy away from providing, which is to say that they tend in the di-
rection of offering no insurance at all. Voluntary insurance markets, 
in particular, accordingly tend to break down in these cases.
To return to the barn story, suppose that ten of us have formed 
an insurance pool of the sort previously described. Now an eleventh 
farmer, who refrained from joining our pool before, asks to join. 
Hmm, we wonder, why the change of heart? Does he know something 
we do not—for example, that one his many children, whose identity 
he cannot seem to ascertain, has taken to smoking in secret in the 
barn—which might account for his sudden interest in seeking to join 
our insurance pool? The more difficult it is for us to find answers to 
such questions, the more reasonable our fears will be, and the more 
economically rational it will look for us to decline membership in the 
pool to this prospective new member. We will fear there is a conscious 
“selection bias,” operating “adversely,” in the “market” that we have 
been asked to expand to this eleventh farmer.
How do we address this problem? One way is to render the insur-
ance contingent upon certain warranties required of those seeking 
insurance—guarantees that there is no “hidden defect” of which the 
would-be insured but not the insurer is aware. In effect, this is to quar-
antine the sorts of possible information that worry us and yet elude 
our capacities to ascertain: we “symmetricalize” salient information 
between insurer and insured by holding that what we cannot ascertain 
simply shall not qualify for insurance. Another, complementary way 
to address adverse selection is to require that all prospective insured 
parties join insurance pools, so that no suspicions need attach to the 
act of seeking enrollment in the insurance pool. In effect, this is to 
take away reasons for fearing asymmetric information by eliminating 
what would have been a plausible inference concerning the motives of 
those seeking insurance. Which of these means of addressing adverse 
selection is best—imposing warranties or imposing insurance itself 
upon all—rides upon further considerations to be addressed below.
The second flavor of asymmetric information tending to block suc-
cessful insurance arrangements, moral hazard, comprises cases in which 
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insureds grow psychologically or financially complacent about risks 
in virtue of their insurance itself, and in consequence act (or omit) in 
manners tending to heighten the probability that the insured risks will 
eventuate. In our barn story, for example, some of us might refrain 
from taking measures to protect our own barns—not stocking them 
with water buckets or fire extinguishers, for example—precisely because 
being insured makes us feel safer. This is probably the most familiar 
pathology afflicting insurance markets, tending to drive up premiums 
over time when it is not possible simply to refuse to render insurance. 
Nearly as familiar are the principal, albeit imperfect means developed 
over time to mitigate moral hazard—“merit rating,” “bonus-malus pric-
ing,” deductibles, and copayments. The first two, notwithstanding the 
technical ring of the terms, simply involve higher charges to people who 
have poor track records—boosting premium rates for smokers or for 
drivers who have caused accidents, for example. The second two involve 
ensuring that some cost will remain borne by the insured even when 
insured events occur, so that there will be at least some disincentive 
against willfully or carelessly occasioning the events.
You might have noticed, from what I have just said, that moral hazard 
is one impediment to well-functioning insurance arrangements that 
does not seem to be addressable simply by broadening risk pools. The 
only means we have for addressing moral hazard is attempting to ensure, 
so to speak, greater morality—greater responsibility or accountability—
on the part of insured parties. You likely will also have noticed, however, 
that all of the impediments to well-functioning insurance arrangements 
other than moral hazard can be met in large part by broadening insur-
ance pools. In general, that is, the more of us with barns who take part in 
the risk-pooling arrangement I have just imagined, the more efficiently 
we are able to provide against risk, particularly if we have warded off 
adverse selection effects by in effect mandatorily “selecting” everyone. 
For then we have minimized the risks of covariance, nonpriceability, 
and one of the two principal forms of asymmetric information, even 
if we have not eliminated them altogether.
The fact that pool-broadening mitigates or eliminates most of the 
impediments to efficient insurance arrangements has one particularly 
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important consequence for public policy: Insurance enjoys large 
economies of scale, also known as “increasing returns.” And that 
means it bears a defining characteristic of what economists long have 
called “natural monopolies”—the sorts of firm that often have to be 
either heavily regulated or publicly provided, as utilities. This takes us 
straight from the subject of insurance to that of social insurance. But 
on the way there, we should take stock of the ways in which human 
health, in particular, interacts with the requisites to well-functioning 
insurance. For these tend to intensify the forms of market failure to 
which insurance arrangements are prone.
Health Insurance: Why It Is More Daunting Than 
Other Kinds of Insurance
The burning barn parable by which I described the requisites to well- 
functioning insurance was, again, highly stylized. For one thing, it 
treated all barns as being more or less alike, simply constructed, equally 
valued, and subject to one and the same basic risk—immolation. For 
another thing, the parable implicitly assumed that we have all freely 
chosen to be farmers for whom barns are important investments, rather 
than having been forced into that condition. This assumption proves 
important for reasons that soon will become clear. Finally, the barn 
parable involved only . . . well, barns. The loss against which insur-
ance is sought is loss of a material object and perhaps even a critical 
contributor to a livelihood, but it is merely a material loss all the same. 
It bears less “existential” import than would the loss of one’s limbs, 
one’s organs, one’s healthy functioning, or like attributes of one’s 
loved ones. Health insurance critically differs from barn insurance 
along all of these dimensions.
For one thing, the human organism is just dazzlingly complex. 
And so, accordingly, are the kinds and severities of malady to which 
it is vulnerable. The etiologies, cures, partial cures, and suitable treat-
ments of the bewildering array of maladies to which we are prone 
are maddeningly difficult to develop firm knowledge about. Far more 
always seems to remain mysterious than to be sorted out once and 
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for all. (Cancer, of course, comes to mind.) It is often difficult even 
to determine when particular clusters of symptoms are attributable to 
a single well-defined “disease,” let alone to determine how to predict 
statistical incidences and cures for such harms. (Autoimmune disease 
here comes to mind.) Moreover, many diseases are, of course, conta-
gious, and even strike in the form of wavelike epidemics. (There is a 
new flu that might come to mind here.) All of this means, of course, 
that both event independence and estimability—the first two requi-
sites to well-functioning insurance arrangements described above—are 
harder to come by when it is health rather than barns that we aim 
to insure. Health insurance, in other words, is even more prone to 
market failures occasioned by nonestimability and covariance than 
are most other forms of insurance.
For another thing, many threats to human health are not attribut-
able even remotely to choice in the way that threats to the barn of a 
farmer might be. Most harm to health appears to be at least partly, 
and in many cases almost wholly, attributable to genetic predisposi-
tions that afflict people differently. You might be born very vulner-
able to Crone’s disease or breast cancer, I to lupus or psoriasis, and a 
mutual friend to no particular ailments at all. Where our statistical 
likelihoods are especially high, there might be literally nothing that 
we can do to avoid being struck by these illnesses. That fact interacts 
with the symmetric information requisite to well-functioning insur-
ance arrangements in several morally critical ways.
If, for example, you know of your own predisposition to an illness 
and a prospective insurer does not, and yet you cannot do anything 
to prevent that illness’s eventuating, is it really fair or otherwise de-
sirable that you be made to disclose this information to an insurer 
who might deny coverage upon learning it? If, by the same token, 
an insurer insists upon genetically screening you and then denies 
coverage on the basis of what she learns, does it really make sense to 
claim that her doing this is simply a means of ensuring “fair”—that 
is, symmetric—access to your genetic information, or “efficient”—i.e., 
afflicted-excluding—insurance by means of “risk-classification” that 
“screens” you out of the pool?
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What these questions highlight is that symmetric information, per 
the third requisite to well-functioning insurance markets, is per se just-
ly shared information only when it is information concerning things 
that afflicted people can do something about. Where the information 
is instead about things they cannot do anything about—things like 
their own genetic endowments—symmetric information is fair only 
when accompanied by what might be called symmetric entitlement 
or symmetric action: allowing prospective insurers no more ability 
to “walk away” from prospective insureds’ faultless misfortune than 
those prospective insureds themselves have. I will have more to say 
on this presently.
Finally, people’s health is much closer to who they are—and indeed 
to the fact that they are, that they are living—than are their barns. And 
this, too, renders health insurance more morally and economically 
fraught than barn insurance. For one thing, of course, it is much harder 
to talk and argue about, without being overcome by fear, dread, and 
like emotions, than is barn insurance. And, of course, we see some 
of this in the current debates over health-care reform—anxieties 
about “end-of-life counseling,” “death panels,” “pulling the plug on 
Grandma,” and so forth.
But for another thing—returning now to the requisites to well-
functioning insurance arrangements catalogued above—the profound 
“existential” significance of our health renders health insurance 
uniquely vulnerable to a particular species of combined estimability 
and moral hazard problem: namely, a seemingly irresistible temptation 
to say “yes” to any new test, drug, or treatment option that looks 
like it might offer even a marginal improvement in the likelihood 
that life will be saved or health restored. We balk, in other words, at 
the thought of conducting ordinary “cost-benefit analyses” when it 
comes to treating, hence insuring against, life-threatening illness or 
poor health. After all, we are inclined to say, life and good health are 
“priceless.” But if that is literally so, then they are uninsurable, too. 
For, as we have noted already, markets do not work without prices, 
and market substitutes will not work without price substitutes.
These extra challenges posed to insurance by risks that confront 
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life, limb, and health simply heighten most forms of market failure—
failures of the requisites to insurance catalogued above, as well as of 
long-term competition—to which insurance is always vulnerable. That 
takes us straight to the theory of market failure and our time-honored 
means of addressing it—regulation and social insurance.
Social Insurance: When It Is Called For, What It Is, 
and What It Is Not
While we seem to be hearing the word “socialism” a lot these days, 
none of those using the term in the health-care debate seems to know, 
or at any rate care, what it means. For its users are talking about 
something entirely different—something long familiar and widely 
supported both in the United States and other industrial societies since 
the late nineteenth century. They are talking about social insurance. 
Social insurance shares something in common with socialism, as the 
shared root “social” in both terms suggests. But by this standard it 
also shares something in common with social science, “social capi-
tal,” and, of course, social security. Social insurance is no more to be 
confused with socialism than are the common good, the common law, 
the community, or communication to be confused with communism. 
We will do well to sort this out quickly before we proceed.
It Is Not “Socialism” (Not That There Would Need to Be Anything 
Wrong with That)
“Socialism” denotes a system of political economy distinguished from 
other such systems by reference to ownership: The socialist economy is 
one in which the state holds property rights in a significant number of 
those instrumentalities or institutions that supply goods and services 
that people require and are willing to pay for.6 National economies 
obviously can be “more” or “less” socialist, according as the state 
holds more or less in the way of ownership rights in the mentioned 
instrumentalities and institutions. The state can hold more or less in 
the way of those ownership rights, in turn, either by holding more or 
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fewer shares in such instrumentalities or institutions, or by holding 
such shares in more or fewer such instrumentalities or institutions 
themselves.
Along the dimension of shares, Mexico owns all shares of that 
country’s sole petroleum company, Pemex. So petroleum pro-
duction is fully socialized in Mexico. China, by contrast, owns 
a controlling interest in, but not all, of its own state petroleum 
company, Sinopec. So petroleum production is largely, though not 
fully, socialized in China. China as a whole is nevertheless more 
“socialist” than is Mexico, because it owns large stakes in many 
more firms than just Sinopec, while the Mexican state is less heav-
ily invested in most firms that operate there. The United States, for 
its part, owns no shares in the petroleum companies incorporated 
or operating within its territorial jurisdiction. So petroleum pro-
duction is not socialized at all in the United States. Nor, for that 
matter, is much else. So the United States can be said to be “more 
capitalist” than those countries.
By contrast, the supply of national defense services in Mexico, 
China, and the United States is provided nearly entirely by the state 
in all three countries. That means that Mexico, China, and the United 
States all enjoy socialized national defense. Essentially the same holds 
true of national intelligence services, “homeland security,” police 
forces, fire departments, environmental and consumer protection 
agencies, and other such public services. All national economies are 
at least partly “socialist” in this sense. Government itself, after all, is 
not privately owned or provided (or so we hope!). So the interesting 
question is not whether, but how much in the way of required or de-
sired services, as well as which such services, are publicly rather than 
privately provided.
Which Goods and Services Tend to Go Public, Even in Capitalist 
Societies?
Which goods or services tend most often—perhaps even necessarily—
to be publicly provided or procured, even in the least “socialist” of 
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societies? Which goods and services, in other words, seem to be in 
some sense inherently “social”? As it happens, economists have de-
veloped a pretty good understanding of this question, just as they 
have of insurance.7 And these two systems of understanding—those 
of “public goods” and necessary regulation on the one hand, insur-
ance on the other—come together in the theory and practice of what 
is called “social insurance.”
One answer to the question of which goods or services tend 
necessarily to be publicly provided or procured is that they are the 
“public goods.” These are those goods and services that tend to be 
undersupplied by private actors, owing to that particular form of 
market failure known as “nonexcludability.” And some forms of 
insurance, it turns out, are public goods in this sense. I return to 
that below.
An additional answer to the question of which goods or services tend 
to be publicly provided—or, in the somewhat more relaxed alternative, 
to be carefully publicly regulated in their private provision—is that it 
is those whose production enjoys increasing returns and hence tend 
to natural monopoly. Supply of these goods and services is subject 
to another form of market failure—a form we noted above to loom 
over insurance itself in consequence of the scale economies of risk 
pooling. A bit more on each of these two forms of market failure will 
now be in order.
“Natural Monopoly” Goods
As just noted, one form of market failure relevant to the case of health 
insurance in particular springs from the so-called “scale economies” 
mentioned above in connection with the requisites to well function-
ing insurance arrangements. Those scale effects give rise to “natural 
monopoly.” Natural monopolies occur where network effects or scale 
economies are such as to render a single provider of some good or 
service the most efficient—that is, the least costly in terms of produc-
tion—mode of provision.8 This condition tends to be found wherever 
current technologies render it significantly cheaper for an existing 
Hockett
42 Challenge/January–February 2010
provider of some good or service to take on additional customers than 
it is for new providers to enter the market for those customers. The 
greater the extent of incumbent advantage in these cases, the greater 
the margin of quality superiority a challenger will have to be able 
to exploit if it hopes to enter the market. And with some things, that 
margin can be daunting.
Before the advent of wireless telephone networks, for example, 
it was notoriously easier for a telephone company simply to add 
more line to its system of telephone cable for new customers than 
for new providers to enter the market with their own cables. There 
was, after all, limited space for competing sets of telephone line 
to be set up in parallel. And so those who got into the act early 
enjoyed “first-mover advantages” enabling them to lock out com-
petitors, simply by dint of the internal efficiencies that what they 
sold happened to confer upon them. In pre-wireless days, it was 
therefore widely accepted that the best way to handle the provi-
sion of telephone services was either to allow regional monopo-
lies, whose prices then would be carefully regulated to prevent 
overcharging of customers lacking in alternatives, or to treat the 
telephone lines themselves as public property for the use of which 
competing telephone companies would have to enter competitive 
bids. Only in that way, it was thought, could the cost efficiencies of 
natural monopoly be exploited without giving rise to the danger-
ous market power that monopoly status conferred.
Pursuant to both regulatory strategies, moreover, participation 
in these naturally monopolistic markets as a provider was made 
contingent upon the supplier’s agreeing to offer the service even to 
remote areas where the cost of provision might not be matched by 
the revenues there generated. The utility was, accordingly, treated 
as being indeed “public,” even when provided by a private—but 
regulated—provider. And so things remain to this day in those indus-
tries that still rely upon “grid technologies” of the pre-wireless sort 
once found in telecommunications—power and light, for example, 
not to mention water, sewage, roads, and the like.
Making Sense of the Health-Care Reform Debate
Challenge/January–February 2010 43
“Pure Public” Goods
The other form of market failure mentioned above that proves relevant 
to health insurance is the “free-rider problem,” encountered in con-
nection with some “public,” “nonexcludable” goods and services that 
cannot be kept from nonpaying consumers.9 (Some roads and bridges 
implicate this form of market failure just as surely as they do natural 
monopoly.) When the armed forces defend me from invaders, they tend 
in so doing to defend you as well. If we financed the armed forces by 
passing around a voluntary collection plate, then the worry is that some 
of us might not contribute our fair share even while enjoying the same 
benefit as those who do. National defense is accordingly paradigmatic 
of the “pure public good”—a good that tends to be underprovided when 
privately financed. In such cases the remedy is public procurement or 
provision, financed through compulsory levies—taxes—that all citizens 
can be required to pay. Cognate considerations underwrite the public 
provision of all manner of public utility, including police protection, 
courts of law, and indeed law and government themselves.
When Insurance Becomes a Natural Monopoly or Pure  
Public Good
When does insurance qualify as a public utility that is best publicly 
procured or provided, or at least heavily regulated? What sorts of 
risk, in other words, might we expect to be best handled not merely 
by insurance, but by social insurance; and why might health risks be 
among them? Against the backdrop of market failure just rehearsed, 
the answer to these queries is found partly in those requisites to all 
well-functioning insurance arrangements discussed further above. It 
also is found partly in those special challenges associated with health 
insurance in particular, likewise discussed further above. Let us con-
sider them in turn.
On the “requisites” side of the story, recall that two of the three 
basic obstacles to well-functioning insurance arrangements—possible 
covariance and inestimability of insured events—are surmounted 
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principally by the broadening of insurance pools. More in the pool 
means greater capacity for cross-subsidy among insureds, and greater 
accuracy in the determination both of harm-costs and of probabili-
ties. That is part of the reason that large employers are advantaged 
relative to smaller employers in finding affordable insurance for their 
employees. But the larger story here is that all of this means that in-
surance pooling is like network extending in the relevant respect. It 
enjoys vast economies of scale, hence increasing returns, hence the 
principal attribute of “natural monopoly.” If power and light provi-
sion calls out for public provision or close public regulation, then so 
might insurance of some sorts.
On the “special challenges associated with health” side of the story, 
it is in part the third basic obstacle to well-functioning insurance 
arrangements—possible asymmetric information—that is most salient. 
And now it is with the “free riding” form of market failure that the 
structure of insurance interacts so as to render insurance a public 
good. For, note first that a principal means of avoiding the adverse- 
selection problem is by requiring participation by all, in order that 
no particular inference need be drawn from somebody’s seeking to 
participate. But only the state has authority to require that people 
participate in insurance pools—as states routinely do, for example, 
with driver’s insurance, social security, and Medicare.
It should be emphasized in this context that in requiring partici-
pation in such insurance pools, government is doing more than ad-
dressing the adverse-selection obstacle to well-functioning insurance 
arrangements. It is also preventing a form of free-riding—for example, 
that of uninsured motorists upon the coverage of insured motorists. 
So we now have transitioned to the other form of market failure 
discussed above—we have elided from the natural monopoly to the 
public-good rationale for social insurance.
In the latter connection, note now that other special challenges 
posed by medical care discussed above also implicate the public-good 
side of our story. Consider, for example, the observation that symmetric 
information can actually be a bad thing when would-be insurers gain 
access to genetic information and then deny coverage to individuals 
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whose health challenges stem from something over which they have 
no control—their genetic dispositions to illness. Our intuitive objec-
tion to this prospect—an intuition that virtually all Americans appear 
to share—is rooted in our sense of fairness. It seems fundamentally 
unjust that people with literally unavoidable maladies might simply 
be thrown from the rolls of insurance companies.10
But our demand for justice in such cases is a demand for a public 
good—arguably the public good par excellence. For no party acting upon 
private pecuniary motive alone can be confidently expected to supply 
justice to the victims of injustice, any more than unregulated provid-
ers of landline telephone service could in earlier times be expected 
to voluntarily supply telephone service to remote areas. And yet the 
case for compulsory supply here is much greater than it would have 
been there, inasmuch as people choose to remain in remote areas but 
do not choose to be genetically disposed to illness. 
Moreover, just as it would seem unjust to permit the denial of 
insurance to those born with predispositions to illness, so would it 
seem unjust to saddle some insurers with more of the costs involved 
in compensating those born with risky genes than others. And that 
could conceivably happen if, say, we simply prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of genetic information or preexisting conditions. 
Arguably, then, the compensation of those who suffer through no 
fault of their own is something that all of us, not merely some of us, 
have a responsibility for. (Any one of us might turn out to be such a 
sufferer.) And that is just another way of saying again that insurance 
against these kinds of risks—risks that no individual is at fault for—is 
a public good. Justice, which is again what we are talking about here, 
is the ultimate public good.
Another public good that health insurance, along with some other 
forms of insurance like unemployment and retirement insurance, 
might be expected to provide comes in the form of so-called “factor 
mobility.” The idea here is that when workers feel confident in mov-
ing from one locality or company to another, without worrying that 
in leaving one they might lose some irreplaceable form of insurance, 
factors of production—in this case, workers—are able more readily to 
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move to those places where they will add most value.11 That in turn 
conduces to greater growth in the larger economy. But this means that, 
in the absence of publicly provided insurance of these kinds, there will 
be a tendency for workers to stay put with firms or in localities where 
either insurance or substitute forms of social support are available. 
And that in turn means that large firms and extended families—firms 
that employ many workers and families that stay put in ancestral 
regions—tend to enjoy natural advantages over smaller firms and new 
localities in attracting labor. That is a drag on growth.
The problem here stems, once again, from the pooling economies 
already discussed. It is cheaper for a large firm to insure workers be-
cause it has many of them, meaning it has a large pool and enjoys 
bargaining power vis-à-vis insurers to boot. Small businesses, by 
contrast, lack these advantages. And since small businesses tend to 
be the chief sources of innovation and growth in our economy, al-
lowing them to be disadvantaged relative to larger firms operates as 
a drag upon innovation and growth. There will accordingly tend to 
be widespread benefits—indeed, public goods—conferred upon the 
larger economy, stemming both from the freeing up of labor to move 
to its most value-adding uses, and from the elimination of pooling 
advantages enjoyed by large firms over small businesses, where neces-
sary forms of insurance such as health insurance are publicly rather 
than privately provided. That is a part of the reason, for example, 
that Bismarck first introduced national health insurance and other 
forms of social insurance—unemployment and pension insurance—in 
nineteenth-century Germany. The aim was to jumpstart economic 
development by removing a major impediment to factor mobility.12
A related point relevant to the U.S. case is that all chief economic 
competitors of the United States have long since followed Germany’s 
early example. They tend to treat certain forms of insurance—notably 
including health insurance—as public goods, and in consequence 
either afford maximal pooling in the form of “single payer” plans 
or directly provide health care itself. This means that non-American 
firms enjoy a decisive advantage, with respect to labor costs, over 
their American competitors, even as non-American economies enjoy 
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a leg up on labor mobility in consequence. This in turn means that 
there is yet another sense in which the provision of some forms of 
insurance—including health insurance—at the public rather than pri-
vate level would be in the nature of a public good. No private party 
can provide this advantage to the U.S. economy as a whole. Only the 
public itself, as a whole, operating through its agent—its democrati-
cally elected government—is able to supply that.
The foregoing considerations jointly explain why the particular 
forms of insurance that we or our counterpart nations tend to treat 
as “social insurance” are those we have chosen. The chief forms, as 
suggested a moment ago, are retirement insurance, unemployment 
insurance, and health insurance. In all three cases we handle supply 
partly through direct public provision, and partly through tax-favored 
private provision. But in the health field the public component is thus 
far underdeveloped in the United States as compared to its compet-
ing counterpart nations, and the current debate is at bottom a debate 
over how best to fill that gap.
Retirement insurance in the United States takes the forms of both 
social security, which sets a floor below which no elderly citizen’s 
income will fall, and tax-favored retirement-savings plans such as 
the popular 401(k). Unemployment insurance, especially in times 
of significant economic dislocation, takes the form of direct pay-
ments available for brief periods as laid-off workers seek new jobs, 
job training programs, food stamps, reduced taxation at the low 
end, and related programs. Both of these forms of social insurance 
are complex in their constituent parts and their functioning. In 
particular, they are subject to significant moral hazard challenges. 
It is in consequence of that fact that the government plays any role 
at all, for it possesses maximal authority to police and enforce the 
terms of the insurance “contract.” It is also why the role to which 
the government limits itself is that of supplying a minimal safety 
net, in effect imposing a form of deductible or coinsurance upon 
beneficiaries.
There is a sense in which our government affords a form of social 
health insurance that is similar, in the respects just noted, to those 
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forms of retirement and unemployment insurance that it provides. 
It affords single-payer health insurance (more on which qualifica-
tion presently) to the old and the infirm or impoverished, in effect 
providing a manner of minimal “safety net” for those in extremis. 
It also does so for government employees and veterans—in the latter 
case even providing the care itself. As it happens, however, the means 
by which this net is provided are much more inefficient than neces-
sary, and it could readily be broadened to include more than those 
who are in extremis. That is especially clear when we compare U.S. 
health expenses and health outcomes with those of all other devel-
oped countries.
Rather than separately reprise the many widely cited comparisons 
between the United States and other developed countries, however, 
I conclude this discussion by showing how all the principal “issues” 
now under discussion in the current U.S. debate grow more intelligible 
by reference to the insurance, health insurance, and social insurance 
considerations outlined above. Cross-country comparisons find their 
way into some of this discussion.
The Current Debate and Competing Proposals in 
Light of the Foregoing
All of the perceived problems with our national “system” of health 
insurance grow more comprehensible when viewed against the back-
drop of the theory and practice of insurance and social insurance 
reprised above. So are the multiple proposals on offer right now 
for addressing them. Let us break it down, ill by ill and proposal 
by proposal.
The Pathologies
All the perceived ills that are agreed to afflict our present system of 
health-care insurance and finance grow comprehensible against the 
backdrop of insurance and social insurance fundamentals laid out 
above. In particular, they all turn out to be traceable at least in part, 
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if not in full, to the combined effects wrought by insurance’s “natu-
ral monopoly” characteristics and “moral hazard” vulnerabilities, as 
intensified by the moral and emotional stakes involved when it is 
health that we aim to insure.
Noncompetition, Health-Care Costs, and Health Insurance Costs
Probably the chief dysfunction regularly cited by critics of our cur-
rent health-care and health insurance regime is its set of “spiraling” 
costs. Parties on all sides of the current debate seem agreed on the 
following statistics. The United States currently spends at least 150 
percent more per capita than any other industrial country on health 
care. Health-care costs represent one-sixth of our economy now and 
are projected to reach about one-fifth by 2015. These costs have been 
rising at about three times the general inflation rate for some time 
now, and consequently are now more than double what they were 
only ten years ago. Health insurance premium rates have risen even 
more rapidly, being up now more than 120 percent what they were 
ten years ago, as compared to wage and salary rises of only 40 percent 
over the same interval. Further, it is estimated that each American 
citizen in effect pays $1,000 per year to cover emergency room care 
provided to the uninsured, as this form of access constitutes our 
principal “safety net” offered to those who either cannot or do not 
pay for regular health insurance.13
It is not difficult to appreciate why the foregoing might be true, 
against the backdrop of the insurance discussion above. For the fact is 
that health insurance in the United States shows the effects of precisely 
those “natural monopoly” attributes of insurance discussed above. 
Those attributes combine with the “moral hazard” vulnerabilities to 
which all insurance, and health insurance especially, are prey, in a 
manner that generates growing costs and growing exclusion of less 
wealthy citizens from insured status. While other causes are at work 
here as well, few are likely to be as critical as this one.
What are the mechanics? First, a small number of health insurance 
companies dominate in all state and regional insurance markets in the 
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United States. Competition, all sides to the current debate agree, is 
sorely lacking. Once again numbers are telling: There are only three 
states in the United States where the two largest health insurers control 
less than 50 percent of the market. In twenty-five states, the two larg-
est insurers control 50–70 percent of the market; in twelve states, the 
top two control 70–80 percent of the market; and in another ten they 
control 80–100 percent. In seven states, moreover, the largest insurer 
controls 75 percent or more of the market.14 The pooling economies of 
insurance discussed above, of course, account for this market power, 
and the latter in turn accounts for spiraling costs.
As it happens, however, the noncompetition problem in the United 
States is even worse than might have been anticipated on the basis of 
pooling economies alone. For the problem is accentuated by a peculiar 
feature of our national law: the McCarran-Ferguson Act, enacted by 
Congress over sixty years ago, both exempts insurance companies from 
federal antitrust law and consigns the right to regulate insurance in all 
other respects to the states.15 That means in turn that small numbers 
of health insurers not only quickly come to dominate markets within 
states without falling afoul of antitrust law, they also are slowed in their 
capacity to grow even larger, across states, which could enable them 
to enjoy yet greater economies of scale that might, at least in theory, 
result in savings that could be passed on to customers. The law here, 
in other words, leaves us with the worst of both worlds.
What is the result? It is much what theory would have predicted: 
Insurers facing little competition are able to, and do, charge high rates 
to their customers, in effect setting their rates in keeping with classic 
monopoly or oligopoly pricing models. That renders health insurance 
unavailable to people at the middle-to-low end of the income spec-
trum. Meanwhile, those who can and do afford insurance face little 
incentive to keep their health costs low, precisely because they are 
insured. (Here is where “moral hazard” kicks in.) As their costs rise, 
so do those of insurers, who over time pass these along to customers, 
rendering insurance yet more expensive and more difficult to retain 
for more and more people. And so the vicious spiral continues. More 
on this below, when we turn to proposed solutions.
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Rising Numbers of Uninsured and “Unsure” Insured
As would be expected in the world of spiraling costs just described, the 
ranks of those in the United States without health insurance are large and 
growing in number, and this, too, is a principal concern shared by most 
parties to the current debate. Again the numbers are telling. The United 
States has by far the largest numbers and percentage of uninsured citizens 
in all the industrialized world. Nearly one-sixth of U.S. citizens—about 
47 million—lack health insurance. A little over 10 percent of Americans 
under the age of eighteen are among them. Slightly under 20 percent of 
Americans from eighteen to sixty-five are among them. And surprisingly, 
about 2 percent even of those over sixty-five lack health insurance. All 
these numbers represent dramatic deterioration over the past several 
decades, a fact that feeds into a related “issue”—the growing insecurity 
of insurance even among those who now have it.16
The insecurity of existing insurance among the presently insured 
takes a number of forms. One form has already been suggested—that, 
as costs continue to grow, more and more are thrown off the rolls. 
Another form is the lack of portability of insurance among most 
Americans, from company to company or place to place. That form 
interacts with yet another—the propensity of insurance companies to 
deny coverage for “preexisting” health conditions.
These forms of insecurity among even the already insured, like the 
lack of insurance itself, constitute both moral and economic prob-
lems. The most obvious moral problem is associated with denials of 
coverage for preexistent conditions. For, as we noted above, harm for 
which you are not responsible is not harm with which you can justly 
be saddled. Another moral problem associated with missing or inse-
cure insurance stems from the fact that there are certain degrees of 
desperation to which a decent society just does not allow its citizens 
to fall. If all other industrialized nations—nearly none of which are 
as wealthy as we—are able to provide secure health insurance cover-
age to literally all of their citizens, it seems obscene that we have not 
figured out how to do the same, and are even now watching as more 
and more lose the little coverage they had.
As for the economic problems to which lack of secure insurance 
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gives rise, there are at least two very obvious ones. I alluded to one 
earlier: lack of portability operates as a drag upon factor mobility. An-
other is more general in its operation: People who lack secure health 
insurance tend to be more cautious not only about moving, but also 
about spending. Liquidity preference and hoarding are not helpful 
in an economy that is struggling, as ours is post-crisis, to find its way 
out of recession.
Projected Worsening by the “Age Wave”
Finally, the foregoing difficulties afflicting our present system of 
health-care insurance are apt to continue to intensify, especially as the 
U.S. population ages. It is widely appreciated that the “baby boom” 
generation is now beginning to enter retirement and that the many 
health challenges associated with aging are set to balloon among 
Americans. At the same time there are comparatively fewer Americans 
in the lower age brackets to finance care for the aging via our “pay as 
you go” system of Medicare. Against this backdrop, even health-care 
and health insurance costs that rose at the same rate as the general 
rate of inflation would constitute a serious national problem. Costs 
rising at three times that rate will be simply unsustainable. All parties 
to the present debate seem to agree that they threaten to bankrupt 
the nation.17
The Proposed Cures
All the proposed remedies to our present ills currently under discussion 
grow more intelligible against the backdrop of the ills themselves as just 
characterized—and hence even more intelligible against the backdrop of 
those insurance basics, by which I have just characterized the ills.
The “No Denials for Preexisting Conditions” Denial
One measure that seemingly all parties to the present debate agree 
upon is a flat prohibition on denials of coverage for preexisting con-
Making Sense of the Health-Care Reform Debate
Challenge/January–February 2010 53
ditions.18 As ugly as the present debate has been at some points, this 
agreement is something to be celebrated. It indicates broad consensus 
to the effect that a significant injustice is no longer to be legally toler-
ated, hence that justice for those who are ill through no fault of their 
own is a public good deserving of public assurance. It bears noting, 
however, that in order for this prohibition itself not to operate as an 
injustice on companies disproportionately approached by persons 
with preexisting conditions, agreement on further proposals—among 
them those discussed below—will have to be forthcoming as well. In 
other words, proper health insurance reform must be suitably com-
prehensive health insurance reform. It is a package deal.
The Requirement That Uninsured Citizens Obtain Insurance
As noted above, the principal feature of our current health “safety 
net,” such as it is, is a long-standing requirement that emergency 
rooms afford treatment to all who enter their doors irrespective of 
insured status. In return, the government compensates emergency 
care givers—meaning that at least this much health insurance is in 
effect publicly guaranteed to all. But this operates as an inefficient 
method of insuring. The reason is that emergency room treatment is 
very expensive treatment. Here, then, is a significant source of high—
and avoidable—costs.
Presumably for this reason, there is wide agreement that at least 
some manner of requirement should be imposed upon those who ei-
ther are able to afford health insurance, or who with public assistance 
would be, to purchase it.19 The idea here is very simple. If you can 
afford insurance but do not purchase it, you are among those who 
impose an avoidable cost upon others—a cost to the tune, as noted 
above, of $1,000 per annum upon each American. Because most seem 
agreed on the principal operative in this requirement, most disagree-
ment associated with it centers on how best to render health insurance 
affordable to those who presently lack it only because they cannot 
afford it. That takes us to the next, and by far most contested, set of 
competing proposals.
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“Exchanges,” “Public Options,” “Co-ops,” and “Single Payer”
Easily the most controversial real question—as distinguished from 
such hoax-questions as those concerning “government rationing” and 
“death panels”—in the current health-care reform debate concerns how 
best to address the problem of noncompetition between health insur-
ance providers. This problem, as noted above, is significantly at the 
root of the rising costs and rising ranks of uninsured and insecurely 
insured problems considered above. Unfortunately, however, we have 
yet to explicitly recognize, in the public debate itself, the fundamental 
“natural monopoly” origin of this cluster of ills. Were we to do so, we 
would be much better able to make sense of the current fracas over 
“exchanges,” “public options,” “health-care cooperatives,” and even 
the presently dormant “single payer” option. We would also be much 
better able to assess what is more likely to work.
Most parties to the present debate agree that exchanges might be a 
good idea, regardless of whether they are supplemented by a public 
option or by co-ops.20 (Single-payer health care, by contrast, would 
render the idea of an exchange otiose.) The idea here is to standard-
ize the modes in which certain categories of essential information 
provided by insurance providers is presented. Then consumers would 
be able to compare what is offered by companies in their vicinities 
within these categories, and thus make intelligent comparisons. As 
things presently stand, consumers hoping to “shop” between com-
peting insurance plans—few as these are—are faced with proverbial 
“apples and oranges” comparisons owing to the dissimilar ways in 
which companies categorize relevant data. Exchanges, then, would 
offer something analogous to what the public stock exchanges have 
long offered in comparison to older-style “over the counter” markets 
in corporate debt and equity.
While no one apparently objects to the proposal to institute insur-
ance exchanges, there is significant disagreement over whether they 
would suffice to address our ills. While those who charge that they 
would not have been regrettably unclear about why that is so, the 
underlying reason would be this: Owing to the natural monopoly 
characteristics of health-risk pooling elaborated on above, health 
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insurance markets are apt to be dominated by a very small number 
of very large firms even if prospective customers are more able to 
compare what is on offer from allegedly competing oligopolists. Since 
a nonprofit public, “single-payer” option such as “Medicare for all” 
is off the table right now, the “public option” has turned out to be 
the proposed cure for the oligopoly ill that has drawn the most atten-
tion. It has also, unsurprisingly, drawn the most ire from incumbent 
insurance firms and the politicians they bankroll.
The basic idea behind the “public option” is that a public pro-
vider of insurance, unencumbered by the requirement of making 
shareholders happy by increasing profits at the expense of insured 
customers with no other options, would be able to improve existing 
insurance markets in two ways. First, it would do so by making insur-
ance available more cheaply both to the presently uninsured and to 
any presently insured who are stuck with their present arrangements 
owing to noncompetitive state markets. Second, by virtue of that first 
feature, the public option would help by presenting incumbents with 
a serious competitor more beholden to health-care recipients than 
to shareholders in search of profits. That would in turn induce even 
private providers to render better service at lower prices, and hence 
reap profits by becoming more efficient rather than by poorly serving 
customers who lack other options.
While incumbents and their agents in Congress have, unsurpris-
ingly, objected to the specter of serious competition from a public 
provider, their putative arguments against the “public option” thus 
far have been remarkably implausible. Indeed, they have been self-
contradictory. On the one hand, these opponents complain that a 
public provider would enjoy an unfair leg up on private providers by 
dint of its soft budget constraint, and thus “unfairly” out-compete 
them. A government-run plan, in other words, could operate at a loss 
and still operate, thanks to the government’s tax power. Incumbents 
say these things, however, as if unaware that a requirement of budget 
neutrality has been written into any legislation establishing a public 
provider. They (and the recent PricewaterhouseCoopers study they 
bankrolled) cynically ignore, in other words, the fact that operating 
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at a fiscal loss has been prohibited by the instituting legislation itself. 
Incumbents also proffer their anti-public argument as if unaware that 
private schools, colleges, and universities, as well as mailing and ship-
ping companies, all do perfectly well in markets that also include public 
schools, colleges, and universities, as well as the U.S. Postal Service.
It also bears noting that opponents of the public option in other 
moments argue that a public provider would constitute a bloated 
and inefficient “bureaucracy” likely to “come between patients and 
their doctors.” They make this claim as if they were unaware that it 
contradicts the first one. For would a hopelessly inefficient public 
plan, prohibited from operating at a loss, really be able to outcom-
pete a putatively efficient private one rendered “lean and mean” by 
the disciplining effects of private markets? These critics also lay the 
inefficiency charge as if unaware that Medicare and Medicaid cur-
rently operate much more efficiently—at shockingly lower cost—than 
do private insurance companies. They also do so as if unaware that 
it is actually private insurers, never public ones, that are constantly 
castigated for “coming between patients and their doctors,” as any 
insurer aiming to counteract moral hazard must do.
It is difficult, then, to credit the now familiar arguments against 
the public option with good faith. The only apparently good-faith 
concerns raised with the public option raised thus far have been di-
rected not to the merits of the public option as such, but to strategic 
considerations made relevant by the bad-faith arguments heard from 
opponents. They have focused, in other words, on what best to do 
as a political matter in view of some successes enjoyed by sectional 
interests in manipulating some members of an already frightened and 
bewildered public with outright fabrications about “death panels,” 
unrecouped costs, African-American Nazi presidents, and similar 
nonsense.
It is against this backdrop that the “health-care cooperatives” idea 
proffered by some professed “moderates” is best understood. (Pro-
ponents of single payer say it is the public option that is the actual 
“moderate” compromise.) The co-op idea, in a nutshell, is in effect to 
return to a scenario not unlike that of our homespun burning barn 
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parable presented at the beginning of this article. The government 
would somehow provide institutional means through which presently 
uninsured people, along with others who are dissatisfied with their 
present insurance arrangements, could come together and pool health 
risks in the way that the farmers in our parable did. How it would do 
that remains vague at present, and that is likely no accident. For to 
describe more specifically what role a government instrumentality 
would play in facilitating this form of pooling is to describe something 
that looks a lot like a . . . public option.
The problem with the co-op idea is subtle, but damning. First, you 
will recall that the burning barn parable involved individuals who were 
more or less identically situated, in close proximity to one another 
within a single locality. I deliberately stacked the deck, in other words, 
to suggest that the parties had more or less homogeneous interests 
and were able to meet and decide and administer things together as 
a more or less cohesive community. But as groups of people grow 
larger, and the occupations and interests and demographic and other 
characteristics of those people grow correspondingly more diverse, the 
folksy New England town meeting image of communities deciding 
things together and acting as one quickly fades as a plausible image 
of how things work. Any pool large enough to surmount the event 
independence, cost-estimate ability, and adverse selection challenges 
observed above to face workable health insurance arrangements will 
be much too large to make decisions and operate in the manner of a 
small college faculty or New England town meeting. It will also be too 
large to avoid the presence and operation of severe conflicts of interest 
among diverse constituents. That means that ultimately it will have to 
vest quotidian decision-making and administrative authority in some 
sort of board, which will in turn institute a managerial hierarchy.
The “co-op,” in other words, if it is to be large enough to surmount 
the classic obstacles that always stand in the way of efficient insurance 
arrangements, will take on the attributes of a corporation—a corporate 
insurance company. Then, if that company-like entity is provided, 
sponsored, or administered by the government as contemplated by 
those now advocating co-ops, it becomes indistinguishable from the 
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public option. If, on the other hand the government withdraws once 
the sufficiently large co-op is up and running, the co-op will face 
enormous pressure to go corporate and seek external capitalization 
from outside investors rather than remaining a standard-form co-op. 
It will, that is, come to be owned not by its customers, but by external 
shareholders.
Why? Because buyer and seller co-ops work in the long run only 
when the buyers or sellers of their products who own them are ho-
mogeneous in respect of their interests in the firm.21 If all those who 
would own Ocean Spray are growers of fungible cranberries, who have 
no interest in Ocean Spray other than as a buyer of their cranberries, 
then their owning and operating Ocean Spray will have some hope of 
working in the long run. Members of that agricultural sellers’ co-op, 
which is what Ocean Spray in fact is, will be able to apportion their 
voting rights in proportion to their patronage—the quantity of more 
or less fungible cranberries they grow and sell to it. The firm will in 
consequence face no significant internal governance difficulties. It 
more or less closely resembles, in other words, the picture presented 
in our barn parable.
Where the would-be members of a health co-op are concerned, 
however, matters stand very differently. For what these diverse peo-
ple’s coverage needs are, and what they seek from the firm, and what 
their demographic features and other interests are, all will tend to 
vary dramatically—much more than those of cranberry farmers qua 
cranberry farmers. Under such circumstances, what always occurs is 
“demutualization,” whereby the firm converts from a commodity 
co-op to a “capital co-op”—a publicly traded corporation, owned by 
more homogeneous equity contributors rather than by heterogeneous 
customers with, say, radically differing health profiles. This is, of 
course, precisely what happened to what used to be the most famous 
insurance co-op in America—Blue Cross and Blue Shield.22 It is also 
what happened in the life insurance industry in the twentieth century, 
and to the “mutual benefit societies” of the nineteenth century. And 
it is why nowadays you only find noncorporate co-ops in sectors like 
cranberry production.23
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The co-op idea now being floated by some “moderate” Democrats 
in the Senate, then, is at best a means of offering the public option 
without using that word that seems to exercise hysterical Republicans—
”public.” At worst it offers simply another private insurance company 
ultimately destined to be swallowed by some other private firm or 
firms in an industry where scale economies naturally conduce to 
monopoly or oligopoly.
What, then, about the one option presently said to be not on the 
table—“single payer” health care, or even “national health care”? As it 
happens, little need be said here about how well or otherwise such ar-
rangements “would” work; multiple examples are operating out there 
in the proverbial real world for all to see. Every single industrialized 
country other than the United States offers one or another of these 
systems, and every one of them scores better than does the United 
States on all metrics of comparative health-care performance. That 
seems unlikely to be a mere accident.
To Americans, probably the best-known example of a single-payer 
system is that of Canada. And it bears noting in this connection 
that Canada’s system (a) is nearly universally applauded, yet (b) was 
initially resisted, before adoption in the 1980s, by sectional interests 
who sought to whip up hysteria by making the same claims we hear 
from the far right today in the United States. Probably the best-known 
example of direct provision of health-care services, to Americans at 
any rate, is that of the British National Health Service (NHS). It, too 
was resisted, upon introduction earlier in the twentieth century, 
by rightists—in terms that anticipated those heard from right-wing 
American alarmists today. And it, too, is now widely applauded—not 
only as fair and effective, but as a great source of national pride—by 
Conservative, LDP, and Labour adherents alike.24
Britain’s NHS recently found itself the subject of a tragicomic in-
cident in the American debate, an incident that could not be more 
emblematic of the farce this debate has become: Business interests 
in the United States opined in the press that the renowned astro-
physicist Stephen Hawking would have been deemed unfit to live 
had he lived under a system of health care like Britain’s. Apparently 
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these people did not realize that Hawking, a Briton, has in fact been 
the beneficiary of NHS-delivered health care all of his life—a fact of 
which Hawking kindly apprised them this summer, while also cred-
iting his life to the fact.25 It would be good if those who now take 
themselves still to be struggling with George III and Parliament at 
their “tea parties” would consult with Hawking, or their erstwhile 
hero Tony Blair, or even the present head of the Conservative Party, 
David Cameron, about the benefits of public health care. It might 
be good for their health.
For purposes of this article, perhaps the most helpful observation 
to make about single-payer and direct provision health-care systems 
like those found in the rest of the developed world is this: They reflect 
express recognition of the most salient fact that has emerged in the 
discussion above. That is the fact that many forms of insurance, and 
health insurance in particular, tend to be very much in the nature of a 
public utility, precisely by dint of their “natural monopoly” and “pure 
public good” characteristics. For health insurance to be available on 
optimally just and optimally efficient terms, it will in consequence 
ultimately have to be treated as that form of public utility—either as 
a carefully regulated monopoly or as a publicly administered public 
good like police and fire protection. Anything else is at best “second 
best.” Doubtless the simplest option would be a straightforward 
extension, to all, of something already enjoyed by many—including 
the members of Congress itself. That would be something that has 
come to be called “Medicare for all.” That is what our peer nations 
have, and it is a large part of why their populations—as well as their 
economies—are healthier than ours.
Conclusion
I cannot claim in the discussion above to have “solved” the health-
care problem or offered a final conclusion to the ongoing health-care 
reform debate. Nor has that been my aim. I do hope, however, to have 
realized a more modest ambition. I hope I have shown that we can 
make much more sense of the present debate, as well as render the 
Making Sense of the Health-Care Reform Debate
Challenge/January–February 2010 61
difficulties that have occasioned it more tractable, by viewing the 
problems as classic insurance problems—all of them jointly constitut-
ing a classic social insurance problem. Viewed in that light, it seems 
much easier to appreciate why our peer nations have taken the courses 
they have, and what course we ought now to pursue.
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